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Frank Cramer was a handicapped resident at Auglaize Acres Nursing Home. 
Auglaize Acres is a county operated nursing home. Mr. Cramer was completely 
dependent upon Auglaize Acres for his care.    In January 2002, Mr. Cramer fell 
while being assisted to bed by a Hoyer lift operated by two nurses employed by the 
home.  Despite the fall policy not to move Mr. Cramer, the two employees moved 
him to his bed.  Mr. Cramer’s condition was not assessed until five hours after he fell 
despite obvious swelling and bruising and his complaints of pain.  During surgery to 
repair his leg, Mr. Cramer died.  Mr. Cramer’s estate sued Auglaize Acres for the 
nurses’ alleged negligent acts.  Under the Nursing Home Bill of Rights every 
resident of a nursing home may recover damages upon a showing that the home or 
any person has violated the patient's rights.  Mr. Cramer’s codified right to adequate 
medical care was violated.   
The Ohio Supreme Court held that the Nursing Home Bill of Rights allowed a 
cause of action against the home itself, but not against the home’s employees.  
Further, the Court found that the Ohio Political Subdivision Act might re-immunize 
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the home for those acts of its employees that were discretionary.  Residents of a 
county home thus do not have the same protections as residents of other nursing 
homes when the home happens to be owned by the county—a political subdivision.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cramer v. Auglaize Acres curtails the protections of Ohio’s Nursing Home Bill 
of Rights for nursing home2 residents residing in county owned nursing homes.3  
Generally, all nursing home residents are protected by codified rights.4 However, the 
Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act 
to redefine these rights for approximately ten percent of Ohio’s nursing home 
residents. Currently, those residents living in government owned nursing homes are 
substantially less protected from the tortious acts or omissions of the nursing home’s 
employees.   
Since the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, there has been dramatic 
growth in the need for nursing homes. The American population aged sixty five and 
older is projected to double within the next thirty years.5  In view of this projected 
population growth, it is imperative that immediate action be taken to protect 
residents of county owned nursing homes.  
The first baby boomer will turn sixty five in 2011.  According to U.S. Census 
Bureau projections, the population of Americans aged sixty five and older will grow 
from 35 million to 72 million by 2030.6 This escalation will result in the dramatic 
need for and growth of nursing homes.  Nationally there are approximately 
1,750,000 nursing home residents residing in 16,000 nursing homes.7  In Ohio, there 
are approximately 1,400,000 citizens aged sixty five years or older.8  Eighty 
thousand of these citizens currently reside in Ohio nursing homes. Of the 989 
                                                                
1 
 Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9 (Ohio 2007).     
2 24 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 73 (2006).  Nursing Homes are defined as “a private 
institution that furnishes shelter, feeding, and care for sick, aged, or infirm persons.” Id. 
3 Cramer, 865 N.E.2d at 17. 
4 Id. at 268-69.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 3721.13 (West 2006) sets out the rights of nursing 
homes residents.  See infra note 63. 
5 WAN HE ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON AGING, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 
SPECIAL STUDIES: 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES:  2005, (2005)  http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
2006pubs/p23-209.pdf. Currently, persons sixty five and older represent twelve percent of the 
population. Id.  Persons sixty five and older are projected to represent 20 percent of the 
population by 2030. Id. 
6 Id. 
7 National Center for Health Statistics Health, United States, 2006, with Chartbook on 
Trends in the Health of americans 384 (2006) http://www. cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus06.pdf. 
8 UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 2005 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY DATA PROFILE 
HIGHLIGHTS:  OHIO, (2005), http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?_event=&geo 
_id=04000US39&_geoContext=01000US%7C04000US39&_street=&_county=&_cityTown=
&_state=04000US39&_zip=&_lang=en&_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=geoSelect&_useEV=&pct
xt=fph&pgsl=040&_submenuId=factsheet_1&ds_name=DEC_2000_SAFF&_ci_nbr=null&qr
_name=null&reg=null%3Anull&_keyword=&_industry=.  The American Community Survey  
provides yearly detailed data. Id 
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nursing homes within Ohio, two-thirds are privately owned, with the remainder 
owned by the government and nonprofit organizations.9  This dramatic growth in 
                                                                
9 Ohio currently has 54 nursing homes operated by the government.  The number of beds 
per facility follows the name of the home.  Ashtabula County Nursing Home (177), 5740 
Dibble Road, Kingsville, OH 44048; Auglaize Acres (142), 13093 Infirmary Road , 
Wapakoneta, OH 45895; Auglaize County Board of MR/DD, 20 E. First Street, New Bremen, 
OH 45869; Belmont Metropolitan Housing Authority(78), PO Box 398 100 South Third 
Street, Martins Ferry, OH 43935; Butler County Care Facility (121),  1800 Princeton Road , 
Hamilton, OH 45011; Carroll County Home (45), 2202 Kensington Road P.O. Box 365, 
Carrollton, OH 44615; Colonial Manor  (83), 441 University Drive NE, New Philadelphia, 
OH 44663; Coshocton County Memorial Hospital Care Facility (61), 1460 Orange Street, 
Coshocton, OH 43812; Country Garden Manor (16);  Country View Acres (65), 601 Infirmary 
Road, Dayton, OH 45427; Country View Haven (40), R858 County Road 15 P.O. Box 525, 
Napoleon, OH 43545; Crawford County Home (Fairview Manor) (90), 1630 East Southern 
Avenue , Bucyrus, OH 44820;  Cuyahoga County Nursing Home (177), 3305 Franklin 
Boulevard , Cleveland, OH 44113; Darke County Home  (78), 5105 County Home Road, 
Greenville, OH 45331; Dayspring Assisted Living and Care Facility (60), 3220 Olivesburg 
Rd., Mansfield, OH 44903; Drake Center (256), 151 West Galbraith Road, Cincinnati, OH 
45216; East Lawn Manor - Marion County Home (126), 1422 Mt. Vernon Avenue, Marion, 
OH 43302; Elisabeth Severance Prentiss Center (150), 3525 Scranton Road , Cleveland, OH 
44109; Erie County Care Facility (160), 3916 East Perkins Avenue, Huron, OH 44839; Fair 
Haven Shelby County Home (145), 2901 Fair Road , Sidney, OH 45365; Gables at Green 
Pastures (112), 390 Gables Drive, Marysville, OH 43040; Geauga County Home-Pleasant Hill 
 (36), 13211 Aquilla Road , Chardon, OH 44024; Golden Acres Lorain County Nursing Home 
 (82), 45999 North Ridge Rd, PO Box 190, Amherst, OH 44001; Greenewood Manor  (117), 
711 Dayton-Xenia Road , Xenia, OH 45385; Guernsey County Home (40), Country View 
Assisted Living 62825 County Home Rd., Lore City, OH 43755; Hardin Hills Health 
Center (78), 1211 W. Lima Street , Kenton, OH 43326;  Holmes County Home  (60), 7260 
State Route 83, Holmesville, OH 44630; The Liberty (140), 12350 Bass Lake Road , Chardon, 
OH 44024; Lincoln Way Home (50), 17872 Lincoln Hwy., Middle Point, OH 45863; Logan 
Acres Care Center (95),  2739 County Road 91, Bellefontaine, OH 43311; Medina County 
Home  (65), 6144 Wedgewood Road , Medina, OH 44256; Mercer County Home  (42), 4871 
State Route 29 , Celina, OH 45822; MetroHealth Center for Skilled Nursing Center (320), 
4310 Richmond Road, Cleveland, OH 44122; MetroHealth Center for Skilled Nursing Care 
(29), 2500 Metro Health Drive, Cleveland, OH 44109; Monroe County Care Center (60), 
47045 Moore Ridge Rd, PO Box 352, Woodsfield, OH 43793; Morrow County Hosp. Long 
Term Care Facility (38), 651 West Marion Road, Mt. Gilead, OH 43338;  Muskingum County 
Home  (80), 1400 Newark Road , Zanesville, OH 43701;  Ohio Veterans Home (427), 3416 
Columbus Ave. , Sandusky, OH 44870; Ohio Veterans Home Georgetown (168), 2003 
Veterans Blvd., Georgetown, OH 45121; Ohio Veterans Home-Veterans Hall (300), 3416 
Columbus Avenue, Sandusky, OH 44870; Ottawa County Riverview Nursing Home (190),  
 8180 W. State Route 163 , Oak Harbor, OH 43449; Park Health Center (100), 100 Pine Ave , 
St Clairsville, OH 43950; Perry County Home (50), 5550 State Route 37 West , New 
Lexington, OH 43764; Putnam Acres Care Center  (95), 10170 Road 5-H, R.R. 1, Ottawa, OH 
45875; Ridge House (4), 7061 Ridge Rd., Parma, OH 44129; Walter House (4), 4058 Walter 
Rd., North Olmstead, OH 44070; Washington County Home (100), 845 County House Lane , 
Marietta, OH 45750; Wayne County Care Center (50), 876 Geyer Chapel Road , Wooster, OH 
44691; Wellington Nursing and Rehabilitation Center  (99), 2380 State Route 68, PO Box 160 
, Urbana, OH 43078; Williams County Hillside Country Living (71), 09-876 County Road 16, 
Bryan, OH 43506-1012; Wood Haven Health Care Senior Living (108),  11080 East Gypsy 
Lane Road , Bowling Green, OH 43402; Woodlands at Robinson (99), 6831 N. Chestnut St. , 
Ravenna, OH 44266; Wyandot County Nursing Home (100), 7830 North State Highway 199, 
Upper Sandusky, OH 43351; York House (4), 7283 York Rd., Parma, OH 44130. 
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population and need of quality care requires uniformity in the law so all nursing 
home residents are equally protected.   
Nursing home residents “are almost entirely dependent upon nursing homes to 
ensure the[ir] safety”10  Despite the growing need for nursing homes, studies show 
that many nursing homes are understaffed and unable to provide even basic care to 
their residents.11 One in every twenty elderly residents in a nursing home suffers 
from neglect or abuse.12  Annually there are more than 500,000 incidents.13 The most 
common negligence violation is the failure to prevent accidents to residents, “such as 
falls that cause broken or fractured bones or skin lacerations.”14  For example, one 
resident with dementia and poor vision fell four times within a ten month period.15 
The fourth fall was reported as causing no injury.16  However, the resident had 
fractured her femur which contributed to her death nine days later.17   
However, neglect is only one concern. In a recent study over a two year period, it 
was found that one out of every three nursing homes was cited for an abuse 
violation.18  These nursing homes were cited for approximately 9,000 violations.  Of 
these violations, over 2,500 caused harm or serious injury, even placing the resident 
in “immediate jeopardy of death.”19  These citations included instances of employees 
ignoring signs of or being a participant in “appalling physical, sexual, and verbal 
abuse.”20   
In an attempt to protect our aging population, the Ohio General Assembly 
enacted the Nursing Home Bill of Rights.21  The Act states that “any resident whose 
rights under this [act] are violated has a cause of action against any person or home 
                                                                
10 Minority Staff of Special Investigations Division Committee on Government Reform, 
107th Cong., Abuse of Residents Is a Major Problem in U.S. Nursing Homes, ( 
2001)[hereinafter Abuse of Residents] (prepared for Rep. Henry Waxman), available at 
http://reform.democrats.house.gov/Documents/20040830113750-34049.pdf. 
11 Christopher Newton, 90% of Nursing Homes Providing Substandard Care—Federal 
Report, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 20, 2002, at A1. 
12 Martin Ramey, Comment, Putting the Cart Before the Horse:  The Need to Reexamine 
Damage Caps in California’s Elder Abuse Act, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REVIEW. 599, 602 (2002). 
13 Id. 
14 Minority Staff of Special Investigations Division Committee on Government Reform, 
107th Cong., Many Homes Fail to Meet Federal Standards for Adequate Care, , ( 2001), 
available at http://oversight.house.gov/Documents/20040830114240-99423.pdf.  Examples of 
negligent care include: bed sores and/or infections, choking because resident was given the 
incorrect diet, incorrect medicine administered to a resident and negligent supervision of a 
nursing home resident that results in a fall with severe injury or death. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 ABUSE OF RESIDENTS, supra note 10.   
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.10-17 (West 2006). 
246 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 22:241 
committing the violation.”22 However, complete enforcement of the Nursing Home 
Bill of Rights is prevented by political subdivision immunity.23 
The Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act confers general immunity on 
political subdivisions.  Therefore, government owned homes seek to avoid liability 
by raising the defenses provided by the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, 
despite the resident’s rights under the Nursing Home Bill of Rights.  The result is 
that residents of government owned nursing homes have inferior remedies for the 
tortious acts of a county home’s employees. 
II.  CRAMER V. AUGLAIZE ACRES:  HOW THE OHIO SUPREME COURT APPLIED THE 
POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TORT LIABILTY ACT TO THE NURSING HOME BILL OF 
RIGHTS 
In Cramer v. Auglaize,24the Third District’s holding removed all of the 
protections of Ohio’s Nursing Home Bill of Rights from every nursing home resident 
who lives in a county owned nursing home.  The Appellate court held that operating 
a nursing home was a proprietary function.25 Therefore, the county was statutorily 
immune from any liability under the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act 
because (1) the way in which an employee of a nursing home provides medical care 
is a discretionary function, and (2) the Nursing Home Bill of Rights does not 
expressly impose liability on the employees of the nursing home.26   
On appeal,27 the Supreme Court held that the Political Subdivision Act contains 
exceptions to immunity that would make the home liable for the negligent or 
                                                                
22 § 3721.17(I)(1)(a). 
23 See generally Adams v. Gables at Green Pastures Nursing Home, No. 14-06-33, 2006 
Ohio App. LEXIS 6757 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2006) (Court affirmed denial of summary 
judgment on the basis of section 2744 without considering the Nursing Home Bill of Rights); 
Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9 (Ohio 2007) (defining how a claim made under the 
Nursing Home Bill of Rights can proceed in light of the Political Subdivision Tort Liability 
Act).   
24 Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 3d Dist. No. 2-04-39, 2005-Ohio-3609; see supra text 
accompanying note 1.  The trial court held (1) operation of a county home is a proprietary 
function, (2) the nursing home bill of rights expressly imposes liability on the two nurses and 
(3) the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act does not provide the nurses any immunity 
under 2744.03(A)(6)(b).  The Third District Court of Appeals held that (1) the nursing home 
bill of rights did not expressly impose liability on the nurses, and (2) the decision on how to 
administer medical was a discretionary function providing immunity to the employee.   
25 See infra text accompanying note 55. 
26 Cramer at ¶¶ 40, 51-53. 
27 Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9 (Ohio 2007); see also Cramer v. Auglaize 
Acres, 3d Dist. No. 2-04-39, 2005-Ohio-3609.  The trial court held (1) operation of a county 
home is a proprietary function, (2) the nursing home bill of rights expressly imposes liability 
on the two nurses and (3) the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act does not provide 
the nurses any immunity under 2744.03(A)(6)(b).  The Third District Court of Appeals held 
that (1) the nursing home bill of rights did not expressly impose liability on the nurses, and 
thus did not create an exception to immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B)(5), and (2) the decision 
on how to administer medical was a discretionary function providing immunity to the 
employee, under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5).     
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intentionally tortious acts of its employees, but the way in which an employee of a 
nursing home provides medical care is a discretionary function.28  The end result is 
that regardless of Ohio’s Nursing Home Bill of Rights, causes of action brought 
against a county owned nursing home cannot proceed on a theory of ordinary 
negligence, so long as some discretionary action on the part of the employees 
involved is found.29   
A.  The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in Ohio 
Sovereign immunity for political subdivisions was judicially created. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has noted in the past that it can be judicially 
abolished.30  Sovereign immunity is based on the English concept that the “King can 
do no wrong.” 31 “Sovereign immunity is a legal anachronism which denies recovery 
to injured individuals without regard to the municipality's culpability or the 
individual's need for compensation.”32 The framers of our Constitution guaranteed 
that America would have no King.  It is therefore anomalous that political 
subdivisions are given the same benefit of immunity:   
It is something of an anomaly that the common-law doctrine of sovereign 
immunity which is based on the concept that 'the king can do no wrong' 
was ever adopted by the American courts." (Footnote omitted.) Further, 
the United States Supreme Court has also indicated that there is no 
rational justification in American jurisprudence for the English legal 
maxim "the King can do no wrong." Specifically, in Langford v. United 
States, the court stated, "We do not understand that either in reference to 
the government of the United States, or of the several States, or of any of 
their officers, the English maxim has an existence in this country." 33 
                                                                
28 Cramer, 865 N.E.2d at 17-18. 
29 The Cramer decision also takes an expansive view of when an employee’s actions may 
be said to be discretionary.  
30 Butler v. Jordan, 750 N.E.2d 554, 565 (Ohio 2001). 
31 Id. (stating “in the English feudal system, the lord of the manor was not subject to suit in 
his own courts. The king, as highest feudal lord, enjoyed this protection on the theory that no 
court was above him. Further, the king was considered the supreme power and was, thus, 
infallible. His person was considered sacred, and the law ascribed to him the attribute of 
sovereignty. Therefore, it was his personal royal prerogative not to be subjected to suit in his 
own courts. Accordingly, the king could do no wrong.”) 
32 Haas v. Hayslip, 364 N.E.2d 1376, 1382 (Ohio 1977) (Brown, J., dissenting). 
33 Id. at 369; see also Butler, 750 N.E.2d at 559 "Nothing seems more clear than that this 
immunity of the King from the jurisdiction of the King's courts was purely personal. How it 
came to be applied in the United States of America, where the [royal] prerogative is unknown, 
is one of the mysteries of legal evolution. Admitting its application to the sovereign and its 
illogical ascription as an attribute of sovereignty generally, it is not easy to appreciate its 
application to the United States, where the location of sovereignty--undivided sovereignty, as 
orthodox theory demands--is a difficult undertaking. It is beyond doubt that the Executive in 
the United States is not historically the sovereign, and the legislature, which is perhaps the 
depository of the widest powers, is restrained by constitutional limitations. The federal 
government is one of delegated powers and the states are not sovereign, according to the 
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The United States Supreme Court has stated that:  
the English maxim does not declare that the government, or those who 
administer it, can do no wrong; for it is a part of the principle itself that 
wrong may be done by the governing power, for which the ministry, for 
the time being, is held responsible; and the ministers personally, like our 
President, may be impeached; or, if the wrong amounts to a crime, they 
may be indicted and tried at law for the offence.34 
Prior to the introduction of sovereign immunity in Ohio, municipalities were held 
to the same standards for wrongful acts as private individuals.35  In 1854 in City of 
Dayton v. Peas, the Ohio Supreme Court judicially created sovereign immunity.36 As 
the Ohio courts struggled to set standards, the Ohio Supreme Court introduced the 
governmental-proprietary distinction.37 However, the Ohio courts’ attempts to place 
the functions of municipalities into these two categories caused “confusion and 
unpredictability in the law."38 “[T]he classification of the specific functions of 
municipalities has been difficult and frequently lead to absurd and unjust 
consequences.”39   Furthermore, "it is impossible to reconcile all the decisions of this 
court dealing with the subject of governmental and proprietary functions in relation 
to a municipality.”40 This struggle led to the judicial abolishment of sovereign 
immunity in Ohio in 1982.41 
In 1982, the Ohio Supreme Court in Haverlack v. Portage Homes Inc. abolished 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.42  The Court held that a “municipal corporation, 
unless immune by statute, is liable for its negligence in the performance or 
nonperformance of its acts.”43  Nonetheless, less than a year later, the Ohio Supreme 
                                                          
Constitution, as demonstrated forcibly by the Civil War and the resulting Amendments. That 
brings us to the only remaining alternative, that sovereignty resides in the American electorate 
or the people." 
34 Langford v. U.S., 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879). 
35 John A. Gleason & Kenneth Van Winkle, Jr., The Ohio Political Subdivision Tort 
Liability Act:  A Legislative Response To The Judicial Abolishment of Sovereign Immunity, U. 
CIN. L. REV. 501, 503 (1986). Prior to 1854, Ohio courts treated  municipalities the same as 
private individuals when imposing liability.  See Hack v. Salem, 189 N.E.2d 857, 862 (Ohio 
1963) (“In the early reported American cases it apparently was assumed, without argument 
and as a matter of basic justice, that municipal corporations were subject to actions for torts.”) 
36 City of Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80, 99-100 (1854). 
37 Gleason & Van Winkle, supra note 35, at 506-07. 
38 Haverlack v. Portage Homes, Inc., 442 N.E.2d 749,752 (Ohio 1982). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Western College of Homeopathic Medicine v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375, 377-78 
(1861) (municipality is liable for wrongful acts while performing a proprietary function and 
immune when involved with governmental acts); See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Cameron, 33 
Ohio St. 336, 367-368 (1878). 
42 Haverlack, 442 N.E.2d at 752. 
43 Id. 
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Court in Enghauser Manufacturing Co. v. Eriksson Engineering Ltd. reintroduced 
municipal immunity.44  The Ohio General Assembly quickly followed the Ohio 
Courts and passed the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act on November 20, 
1985.45  This Act confers immunity from civil lawsuits on political subdivisions of 
the state.46 
B.  OHIO POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TORT LIABILITY ACT 
Section 2744 of the Ohio Revised Code grants immunity from civil lawsuits to 
political subdivisions of the state, subject to a complicated system of rules and 
exceptions.47  As set forth below, the Political Subdivision Act sets forth separate 
immunities, exceptions, and defenses applicable to the political subdivision itself, 
and also distinctly to the employees of the political subdivision.   
Since the enactment of the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, the 
Ohio Supreme Court and “courts all across the state have been called upon, time and 
time again, to unravel what that law provides as applied to a myriad of fact 
patterns.”48 Courts, “one after another, have found it necessary, when interpreting 
various sections of Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2744, to stretch the statute beyond its 
parameters.”49 This occurs because courts have to make “equitable decisions in an 
inherently inequitable system.”50   
A three tiered system is used to determine whether the political subdivision is 
entitled to immunity.51 Under the first tier, it must be determined whether the entity 
seeking immunity is a political subdivision, and whether the alleged harm occurred 
in connection with a governmental or proprietary function.52  If tier one is satisfied 
then the entity is presumed to be immune.53   However, the political subdivision’s 
                                                                
44 Enghauser Mfg. Co. v. Eriksson Eng’g Ltd., 451 N.E.2d 228, 232 (Ohio 1983) (“[N]o 
tort action will lie against a municipal corporation for those acts or omissions involving the 
exercise of a legislative or judicial function, or the exercise of an executive or planning 
function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the exercise 
of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.”) 
45 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.01-09 (West 2006). 
46 § 2744.01-09. 
47 § 2744.01-09. 
48 Butler v. Jordan, 750 N.E.2d 554, 566 (Ohio 2001). 
49 Id. 
50 Id.  “Courts of appeals all across this state continue to confront fact patterns presenting 
claims of sovereign immunity when the results of so finding would be inequitable at best and 
disastrous at worst.” Id.  “The issue presented, however, is "[w]hat are governmental agencies, 
the general public, and now the courts to make of a section of the Ohio Revised Code that first 
says 'you're not liable,' then says 'you are liable' and then says 'you're not.'” Hallett v. Stow Bd. 
of Educ., 624 N.E.2d 272, 274 (quoting Stuckey v. Trustees of Lawrence Twp. No. CA-
8806, 1992 WL 214485 (5th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1992) (Milligan, J., dissenting). 
51 Cramer, 865 N.E.2d 9,13 (Ohio 2007).  
52 Id. 
53 OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  § 2744.02(A)(1) (West 2006).   
250 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 22:241 
immunity may be removed in the second tier.  In the second tier the entity will lose 
its immunity if any of the exceptions to liability listed in section 2744.02(B) apply.54  
If an exception applies, the political subdivision will be liable unless it can reinstate 
its immunity in the third tier.  The third tier will reinstate immunity if the political 
subdivision can show that a defense listed in section 2744.03 applies.55   
Under the Act, a political subdivision means “a municipal corporation, township, 
county, school district, or other body corporate and politic responsible for 
governmental activities in a geographic area smaller than that of the state.”56  An 
employee of a political subdivision is defined as an “officer, agent, employee, or 
servant, whether or not compensated or full-time or part-time, who is authorized to 
act and is acting within the scope of the officer's, agent's, employee's, or servant's 
employment for a political subdivision.”57 The Act defines a governmental function 
as a “function that is imposed upon the state as an obligation of sovereignty and that 
is performed by a political subdivision voluntarily or pursuant to legislative 
requirement; a function that is for the common good of all citizens of the state.”58  
The function must be one that “promotes or preserves the public peace, health, 
safety, or welfare...[and] involves activities that are not engaged in or not 
customarily engaged in by nongovernmental persons.”59  In contrast, a proprietary 
function is any non-governmental function involving activities that are customarily 
engaged in by nongovernmental persons.60 
The Act sets out five specific exceptions to the general immunity granted to 
political subdivisions.61  In sum, the political subdivision itself is liable for injuries: 
(1) when they are caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, (2) when 
they occur in the performance of a proprietary function, (3) when the political 
subdivision fails to keep public streets or highways in repair, (4) when the injuries 
result from negligent acts occurring in buildings used to perform government 
functions, and (5) when liability is expressly imposed by another section of the Ohio 
Revised Code.62  Where county owned nursing homes are concerned, it is the second 
and fifth of these exceptions that the Cramer court found applicable.  
Finally, the political subdivision can reinstate immunity by asserting one of the 
defenses set out in the Act.63  Notwithstanding an exception under section 
2744.02(B), the political subdivision will be re-immunized if (1) the employee was 
                                                                
54 
 § 2744.02(B). See supra text accompanying notes 55-56. 
55 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.03 (West 2006). See supra text accompanying notes 57-
58. 
56 
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  § 2744.01(F) (West 2006). 
57 § 2744.01(B). 
58 
 § 2744.01(C)(1)(a)-(b). 
59 § 2744.01(C)(1)(c).  The statute provides a nonexclusive list of governmental functions 
at § 2744.01(C)(2)(a)-(u). 
60 § 2744.01(G)(1)(b). 
61 § 2744.02(B)(1)-(5).   
62 § 2744.02(B)(1)-(5). 
63 § 2744.03. 
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involved in a judicial or legislative function, (2) the employees conduct was required 
by law, (3) the injury occurred “within the discretion of the [political subdivision’s] 
employee with respect to policy-making or planning,” (4) the injury occurred while 
performing community service, or (5) the injury was the result of the exercise of 
judgment or discretion in how to use “equipment, supplies, materials, personnel, 
facilities” unless this discretion was made in bad faith, or a reckless manner.64  
Where the liability of the individual employees themselves is concerned, the 
analysis is different.  The three tiered analysis applicable to the political subdivision 
itself does not apply.65 When a plaintiff sues an individual employee of a political 
subdivision, the analysis begins with R.C. 2744.03(A)(6).66 Ohio law states that an 
employee of a political subdivision is liable if (a)  his or her acts were “manifestly 
outside the scope of the employee’s employment or official responsibilities” (b) 
“made with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner,” or 
(c) liability is expressly imposed by another section of the revised code.67 Therefore, 
regardless of any defense to liability, an employee of the political subdivision is 
liable if his “acts or omissions were [committed] with malicious purpose, in bad 
faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.”68 
C.  Nursing Home Bill of Rights 
In 1979, the Ohio General Assembly passed the Nursing Home Bill of Rights to 
protect the aging population that resides in nursing homes.  This statute sets out 
thirty two rights for all nursing home residents.69  All potential nursing home 
                                                                
64 Id.; see Kiep v. City of Hamilton, No. CA96-08-158, 1997 WL 264236 (Ohio Ct. App. 
May 19, 1997) ( “R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) immunity extends only to the ‘exercise of judgment or 
discretion’ of a political subdivision as defined by R.C. 2744.01(F) and not to the actions of 
employees of the political subdivision... If R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) immunity was extended in a 
broad manner to include subdivision employees, the liability provisions of R.C. 2744.02(B) 
would have no force.”);  McVey v. City of Cincinnatti, 671 N.E.2d 1288, 1290 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1995) (stating immunity under §2744.03(A)(5) does not apply to the negligence of employees 
in "the details of carrying out the activity even though there is discretion in making choices."). 
65 
 Cramer, 865 N.E.2d 9, 13 (Ohio 2007). 
66 Id.; Section 2744.03(6) provides: In addition to any immunity or defense referred to in 
division (A)(7) of this section and in circumstances not covered by that division or sections 
3314.07 and 3746.24 of the Revised Code, the employee is immune from liability unless one 
of the following applies: (a) the employee's acts or omissions were manifestly outside the 
scope of the employee's employment or official responsibilities; (b) the employee's acts or 
omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner; (c) 
civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a section of the Revised Code. Civil 
liability shall not be construed to exist under another section of the Revised Code merely 
because that section imposes a responsibility or mandatory duty upon an employee, because 
that section provides for a criminal penalty, because of a general authorization in that section 
that an employee may sue and be sued, or because the section uses the term "shall" in a 
provision pertaining to an employee. 
67 § 2744.03(A)(6)(b); Cramer, 865 N.E.2d at 13. 
68 Cramer, 865 N.E.2d at 13.  The three tiered analysis used to determine the political 
subdivision’s immunity remains independent of whether an individual employee is immune 
from liability  
69 Section 3721.13 sets out the residents rights.   The statute provides: 
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(A) The rights of residents of a home shall include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(1) The right to a safe and clean living environment…  
(2) The right to be free from physical, verbal, mental, and emotional abuse and to be 
treated at all times with courtesy, respect, and full recognition of dignity and individuality; 
(3) Upon admission and thereafter, the right to adequate and appropriate medical treatment 
and nursing care and to other ancillary services that comprise necessary and appropriate care 
consistent with the program for which the resident contracted. This care shall be provided 
without regard to considerations such as race, color, religion, national origin, age, or source of 
payment for care. 
(4) The right to have all reasonable requests and inquiries responded to promptly; 
(5) The right to have clothes and bed sheets changed as the need arises, to ensure the 
resident's comfort or sanitation; 
(6) The right to obtain from the home, upon request, the name and any specialty of any 
physician or other person responsible for the resident's care or for the coordination of care; 
(7) The right, upon request, to be assigned, within the capacity of the home to make the 
assignment, to the staff physician of the resident's choice, and the right, in accordance with the 
rules and written policies and procedures of the home, to select as the attending physician a 
physician who is not on the staff of the home. If the cost of a physician's services is to be met 
under a federally supported program, the physician shall meet the federal laws and regulations 
governing such services. 
(8) The right to participate in decisions that affect the resident's life… 
(9) The right to withhold payment for physician visitation if the physician did not visit the 
resident; 
(10) The right to confidential treatment of personal and medical records… 
(11) The right to privacy during medical examination or treatment and in the care of 
personal or bodily needs; 
(12) The right to refuse to serve as a medical research subject; 
(13) The right to be free from physical or chemical restraints or prolonged isolation except 
to the minimum extent necessary to protect the resident from injury to self, others, or to 
property… 
(14) The right to the pharmacist of the resident's choice and the right to receive 
pharmaceutical supplies and services at reasonable prices… 
(15) The right to exercise all civil rights, unless the resident has been adjudicated 
incompetent pursuant to Chapter 2111. of the Revised Code and has not been restored to legal 
capacity, as well as the right to the cooperation of the home's administrator in making 
arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote; 
(16) The right of access to opportunities that enable the resident, at the resident's own 
expense or at the expense of a third-party payer, to achieve the resident's fullest potential, 
including educational, vocational, social, recreational, and habilitation programs; 
(17) The right to consume a reasonable amount of alcoholic beverages at the resident's 
own expense… 
(18) The right to use tobacco at the resident's own expense under the home's safety rules…  
(19) The right to retire and rise in accordance with the resident's reasonable requests, if the 
resident does not disturb others or the posted meal schedules…  
(20) The right to observe religious obligations and participate in religious activities; the 
right to maintain individual and cultural identity; and the right to meet with and participate in 
activities of social and community groups at the resident's or the group's initiative; 
(21) The right upon reasonable request to private and unrestricted communications with 
the resident's family, social worker, and any other person… 
(22) The right to assured privacy for visits by the spouse… 
(23) The right upon reasonable request to have room doors closed and to have them not 
opened without knocking… 
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residents are given a copy of these rights and a document explaining the provisions 
of the act before entering the home.70 Rights protecting the residents physical health 
and safety include: (1) The right to a safe and clean living environment; (2) the right 
to be free from physical, verbal, mental, and emotional abuse and to be treated at all 
times with courtesy, respect, and full recognition of dignity and individuality; (3) the 
right to adequate and appropriate medical treatment and nursing care and to other 
ancillary services that comprise necessary and appropriate care; and (4) the right to 
have all reasonable requests and inquiries responded to promptly.71 
The Act begins by listing definitions necessary to interpret its meaning.72  The 
Act then specifies additional definitions relevant to the specific civil cause of action 
and other remedies provided.73  A home is defined as a facility that provides housing 
to three or more unrelated individuals, who are dependent upon the services of 
others, including a nursing home, residential care facility, home for the aging, and a 
county home facility.74  This definition was meant to include county owned nursing 
homes, whether licensed or not, within the protections of the Nursing Home Bill of 
Rights.75 
                                                          
(24) The right to retain and use personal clothing and a reasonable amount of 
possessions… 
(25) The right to be fully informed, prior to or at the time of admission and during the 
resident's stay, in writing, of the basic rate charged by the home, of services available in the 
home, and of any additional charges related to such services… 
(26) The right of the resident and person paying for the care to examine and receive a bill 
at least monthly for the resident's care from the home that itemizes charges not included in the 
basic rates; 
(27)(a) The right to be free from financial exploitation;(b) The right to manage the 
resident's own personal financial affairs, or, if the resident has delegated this responsibility in 
writing to the home, to receive upon written request at least a quarterly accounting statement 
of financial transactions made on the resident's behalf...  
(28) The right of the resident to be allowed unrestricted access to the resident's property on 
deposit at reasonable hours, unless requests for access to property on deposit are so persistent, 
continuous, and unreasonable that they constitute a nuisance; 
(29) The right to receive reasonable notice before the resident's room or roommate is 
changed… 
(30) The right not to be transferred or discharged from the home unless the transfer is 
necessary…  
(31) The right to voice grievances and recommend changes in policies and services to the 
home's staff, to employees of the department of health, or to other persons not associated with 
the operation of the home… 
(32) The right to have any significant change in the resident's health status reported to the 
resident's sponsor. 
70 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.12(A)(1)(3)(a)-(c) (West 2006). 
71 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.13(A)(1)-(4) (West 2006). 
72 OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  § 3721.01 (West 2006). 
73 § 3721.01(A)(3). 
74 § 3721.01(A).   
75 Cramer, 865 N.E.2d 9, 15-16. 
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The Bill of Rights provides the resident a remedy for the violation of his or her 
enumerated rights.  It provides that “any resident whose rights under sections 
3721.10 to 3721.17 of the Revised Code are violated has a cause of action against 
any person or home committing the violation.76  The patient may obtain injunctive 
relief against the violation of his or her rights.  Most importantly, the resident may 
receive compensatory damages for an injury negligently inflicted by the owner of the 
home, or any other person who caused the injury, if the patient demonstrates the 
elements of negligence.77  
Thus the Ohio Nursing Home Bill of Rights sets forth a cause of action under 
which the patient can recover for ordinary negligence.78  The language of the Act, at 
section 3721.17(I)(1)(a), makes it clear that this remedy applies equally to the 
employees themselves, and to the home that employs them.  However, according to 
the Cramer court, the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act greatly curtails 
the legal remedies available to residents of government owned nursing homes.  
Currently, a resident of a county owned home can seek relief against the home itself, 
but subject to the “discretionary acts” defense set forth at R.C. 2744.03(A)(5).  If any 
exercise of discretion is found, the aggrieved resident must prove that this discretion 
was exercised maliciously, in bad faith, wantonly, or recklessly. 79   
The Ohio Supreme Court defines recklessness as: 
[t]he actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of others if he 
does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the 
other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead 
a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an 
unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is 
substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct 
negligent.80 
                                                                
76 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.17(I)(2)(a)-(b) (West 2006). 
77 § 3721.17(I)(2)(a)-(b). “The plaintiff in an action filed under division (I)(1) of this 
section may obtain injunctive relief against the violation of the resident's rights. The plaintiff 
also may recover compensatory damages based upon a showing, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the violation of the resident's rights resulted from a negligent act or omission of 
the person or home and that the violation was the proximate cause of the resident's injury, 
death, or loss to person or property. If compensatory damages are awarded for a violation of 
the resident's rights, section 2315.21 of the Revised Code shall apply to an award of punitive 
or exemplary damages for the violation.  Elements of negligence include (1) Defendant owed 
a duty of care to the Plaintiff,  (2) the Defendant breached the duty, (3) the Plaintiff sustained 
an injury, and (4) there is a causal connection between the Defendant’s action and the 
Plaintiff’s injury. 
78 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.17(I)(1)(a) provides: Any resident whose rights under 
section 3721.13 of the Revised Code are violated has a cause of action against any person or 
home committing the violation; see footnote 59 for a list of rights under section 3721.13; 
Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705, 708 (Ohio 1990) (stating an act is negligent when “the 
actor does not desire to bring about the consequences which follow, nor does he know that 
they are substantially certain to occur, or believe that they will). 
79 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.03(A)(5) (West 2006). 
80 Thompson, 559 N.E.2d at 708 (Ohio 1990) (stating an act is negligent when “the actor 
does not desire to bring about the consequences which follow, nor does he know that they are 
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Wherever applicable, this heightened requirement is a marked departure from the 
protections provided by the Nursing Home Bill of Rights.  Moreover, the question of 
where “discretion” is found within the meaning of R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) now decides 
whether the home itself can be held liable in ordinary negligence.  Where there is 
discretion, the county owned home will only be liable for its employees’ conduct that 
rises to the level of being reckless, or worse.   
D.  County Nursing Homes 
1.  What is a County Home? 
A county home is a facility owned and operated by the county commissioner.81 
County commissioners appoint an administrator, who is responsible for the nursing 
home’s operation.82  There are two types of county homes: (1) traditional county 
homes and (2) Medicaid/Medicare certified county nursing homes.83   A traditional 
county home provides custodial, rest home type care and is not certified to receive 
Medicaid or Medicare payments.84 A Medicaid certified county nursing home 
provides nursing care and is operated on Medicaid funds.85 A Medicare certified 
county home is not subject to licensure, but must meet all state and federal standards 
to be certified for Medicaid/Medicare.  The differences between a private nursing 
home and a county home are: (1) the county home is not licensed, (2) the county 
home must comply with Chapter 5155 of the Revised Code, (3) the county home 
must be operated by a superintendent appointed by and under the supervision of the 
county commissioners, (4) the county home must follow state laws in regard to 
payments and benefits of its employees, and (5) the county home may charge private 
pay patients less than it charges Medicaid for the same services.86 
The Nursing Home Bill of Rights mandates that administrators of “homes”87 
furnish every resident with a copy of the rights established under the Nursing Home 
Bill of Rights, including a written explanation of the provisions of the act and a copy 
                                                          
substantially certain to occur, or believe that they will); Fabrey v. McDonald Vill. Police 
Dep’t, 639 N.E.2d 31(Ohio 1994)(adopting the Thompson reckless definition as the standard 
for the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act). 
81 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5155 (West 2006).  The Board of County Commissioners shall 
make all contracts for new buildings and for additions to existing buildings necessary for the 
county home, and shall prescribe rules for the management and good government of the 
home.” 
82 Ohio County Commissioners Handbook.  Available at http://www.ccao.org/Handbook/ 
hdbkchap048.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2007.) 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id.; see generally supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
87 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.01(a)(1)(a)-(b)(ii) (West 2006). A home is defined as a 
facility that provides housing to three or more unrelated individuals who are dependent upon 
the services of others, including a nursing home, residential care facility, home for the aging, 
and a  county home facility; see also § 3721.10(A).   
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of the individual nursing home’s policies and procedures.88 Therefore, before 
residents are admitted into a county home, the home is required to provide the 
potential resident with a copy of the rights established under the Nursing Home Bill 
of Rights.89  Additionally, a copy of the Nursing Home Bill of Rights must be posted 
in every county home.90   The requirements to give residents a copy of the Nursing 
Home Bill of Rights as well as post them for everyday reading allows one to 
reasonably infer that they are protected by these rights.  
2.  County Homes Acting as Market Participants 
In general, when the state enters the market as a participant, the state’s actions 
are treated like those of a private party.91 According to the second tier of the Political 
Subdivision Tort Liability Act, when a political subdivision acts like a market 
participant it is subject to suit for negligence just as non government market actor 
would be.92  In Nice v. Maryland, the court held that when a political subdivision is 
exercising a proprietary function they are liable “in the same manner and to the same 
extent as a private person under the same circumstances.”93 In Ryll v. Columbus 
Fireworks Display, the Ohio Supreme Court held, “the law regarding political 
subdivisions is different when the political subdivision is engaged in a proprietary 
function.”94  Ohio Revised Code 2744.02(B)(2) states, “political subdivisions are 
liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by the negligent 
performance of acts by their employees with respect to proprietary functions of the 
political subdivisions.”95  Political subdivisions engaged in proprietary functions 
acting as market participants should be liable as any private company would be: 
The municipal corporation is no more a legal concept than a private 
corporation. Both arise by operation of law, both necessarily act through 
agents, and both necessarily are going to have agents who at times are 
negligent in the performance of their duties. The ordinary rules of liability 
                                                                
88 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.12(A)(1)(3)(a)-(c) (West 2006). 
89 Ohio County Commissioners Handbook, supra note 76. 
90 Id. 
91 See Owen v. Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 645-646 (1980)(while in the exercise of 
proprietary functions, “the city was held to the same standards of [tort] liability as any private 
corporation”); Nice v. Marysville, 82 Ohio App. 3d 109, 117 (Union Ct. App. 1992)(the rule 
for tort liability for a municipality engaged in a proprietary function under Ohio’s Political 
Subdivision Act is merely a recitation of the common law rule: “the municipality becomes 
liable for damages caused by its negligence in this regard in the same manner and to the same 
extent as a private person under the same circumstances,”), quoting Doud v. Cincinnati, 87 
N.E.2d 243, 246 (Ohio 1949).   
92 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02(B)(2) (West 2006). 
93 Nice v. Maryland, 611 N.E.2d 468, 473 (Ohio App 3d Dist. 1992), See Ryll v. 
Columbus Fireworks Display Co., Inc., 769 N.E.2d 372 (Ohio 2002) (holding that “the law 
regarding political subdivision liability is different when the political subdivision is engaged in 
a proprietary function.”) 
94 Ryll, 769 N.E.2d at 376. 
95 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02(B)(2) (West 2006). 
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applicable to private corporations should give municipalities all the 
protection they require against unreasonable claims.96 
There are 989 nursing homes in Ohio.  Almost ten percent of these homes are 
owned and operated by the government.  Operating a nursing home is not imposed 
upon the State as an obligation of sovereignty.  Moreover, operation of a nursing 
home is not done for the common good of all the citizens of Ohio. Finally, the 
operation of a nursing home is customarily engaged in by private persons.  Profit is a 
driving force behind the operation of nursing homes.97  Nursing homes do almost 90 
billion dollars of business every year.98 Currently, the majority of the revenue that a 
nursing home receives comes from the government and private insurance companies, 
not the resident.  However, when Ohio counties operate nursing homes, their 
residents are without many of the protections of the Nursing Home Bill of Rights.  
For example, they cannot receive punitive damages for any injury.  It is time to 
examine whether counties participating in the nursing home market should be liable 
in the same manner, and to the same extent as the other ninety percent of the nursing 
home market.   
3.  The Nursing Home Bill of Rights Expressly Imposes Liability 
Section 2744.02(B)(5) of the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act states 
that “political subdivisions [are] liable for injury, death, or loss to a person or 
property when civil liability is expressly imposed upon the political subdivision by a 
section of the Revised Code.”99  The Nursing Home Bill of Rights states if a 
resident’s rights are violated, the resident has a cause of action “against any person 
or home committing the violation.”100  Furthermore, the Act includes a county home 
within its definition of a home.  Accordingly, if subsection 2744.02(B)(5) applies to 
county owned nursing homes, under the three tiered analysis, county owned homes 
can be held liable as provided by the Bill of Rights.  But, then the analysis would 
proceed to the third tier:  county homes are re-immunized if they can prove that the 
harm was caused by the exercise of discretion.101   
                                                                
96 Hack v. City of Salem, 189 N.E.2d 857, 868 (Ohio 1963); See Greene Cty. Agricultural 
Soc. v. Liming, 733 N.E.2d 1141, 1148(Ohio 2000) (“when a political subdivision's acts go 
beyond governmental functions (and when it acts in a proprietary nature) there is little 
justification for affording immunity to that political subdivision.  Having entered into 
activities ordinarily reserved to the field of private enterprise, a [political subdivision] should 
be held to the same responsibilities and liabilities as are private citizens.")(quoting  
Schenkolewski v. Cleveland Metroparks Sys., 426 N.E.2d 784, 788 (Ohio 1981). 
97 Eric Bates, The Shame of our Nursing Homes, THE NATION, Mar. 29, 1999, available at 
1999 WL 9306974.  Medicare and Medicaid funds provide almost 75% of every dollar. 
98 Id.   
99 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02 (West 2006). 
100 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.17(I)(1)(a) (West 2006). 
101 Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 3d Dist. No. 2-04-39, 2005-Ohio-3609, at  ¶¶ 33-35; OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.03(A)(3) (West 2006). The political subdivision is immune if the “act 
by the employee involved that gave rise to the claim of liability was within the discretion of 
the employee with respect to policy making, planning, or enforcement powers by virtue of the 
duties and responsibilities of the officer or position of the employee”; R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) the 
258 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 22:241 
Therefore, in both the intermediate court of appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court, 
a central issue of the Cramer case was whether, and to what extent, the Nursing 
Home Bill of Rights expressly imposes liability on county homes, and on their 
employees.   
E.  Cramer’s Application of the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act to 
Claims Arising Under Ohio’s Nursing Home Bill of Rights. 
1.  Running a Nursing Home is a Proprietary Function 
The Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act codified certain situations 
where a political subdivision will be liable in simple negligence, absent a valid 
defense.102 The Act states that a political subdivision is liable for negligence when 
the actor is carrying out a proprietary function.103  
A proprietary function is one that “promotes or preserves the public peace, 
health, safety, or welfare and that involves activities that are customarily engaged in 
by nongovernmental persons.”104  In Starling v. Metrohealth Ctr. Skilled Nursing, the 
court held that running a nursing home was a proprietary function.105 After Starling, 
the nursing home in Cramer was the first to argue on appeal that running a county 
home was a governmental function, and this argument was rejected.   
Furthermore, there has been only one case outside Ohio where a government 
owned nursing home argued its activities were in connection with a governmental 
function.106 In Everett v. County of Saginaw, the court unanimously held that “a 
county hospital's operation of a skilled nursing care unit did not constitute the 
performance of a governmental function.”107  The intermediate court of appeals in 
Cramer held that the injury that occurred in the county home was connected with a 
proprietary function.108    
A governmental function is a function that is “imposed upon the state as an 
obligation of sovereignty and that is performed by a political subdivision voluntarily 
or pursuant to legislative requirement.”109 Additionally, it is a function that is for the 
                                                          
political subdivision will be immune if the injury resulted from “the exercise of judgment or 
discretion in determining whether to acquire, or how to use, equipment, supplies, materials, 
personnel, facilities, and other resources unless the judgment or discretion was exercised with 
malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” 
102 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02 (West 2006). 
103 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02(B)(2) (West 2006); See Gleason, supra note 30. 
104 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.01(G)(1)(b) (West 2006); Ryll,769 N.E.2d at 376. 
105 Starling v. Metrohealth Ctr. Skilled Nursing, No. 75554, 1999 WL 685641, at *2 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Sept. 2, 1999)(holding that the operation of a nursing home was not considered when 
the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act was enacted.) 
106 
 Everett, v. County of Saginaw, 333 N.W.2d 301 (Mich Ct. App. 1983). 
107 Id. at 302-303 (stating  “In determining whether a particular activity constitutes a 
governmental function, the focus is on the precise activity giving rise to plaintiff's claim rather 
than on the entity's overall or principal operation.”) 
108 Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 3d Dist. No. 2-04-39, 2005-Ohio-3609, at ¶ 34. 
109 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.01(C)(1)(a) (West 2006). 
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“common good of all citizens of the state...that promotes or preserves the public 
peace, health, safety, or welfare; that involves activities that are not engaged in or not 
customarily engaged in by nongovernmental persons.”110  “If the function does not 
meet…[these requirements] and is not specified [as a government] function in R.C. 
2744.01(C)(2), it is a proprietary function.111 
a.  Operating a Nursing Home is Not Imposed Upon the State as an Obligation of 
Sovereignty 
R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(a) states a function is governmental “if it is imposed upon the 
state as an obligation of sovereignty.”112 Operation of a nursing home is not a duty 
imposed on a county by the Department of Human Services.113  In other words, the 
government is not required to operate nursing homes by any legislation.  Rather, the 
operation of county homes is controlled by the board of county commissioners.114 
The Starling court stated, “the Revised Code does not indicate that operation of a 
nursing home is a duty to the Department of Human Services.”115  When the 
legislature enacted R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(m),116 it did not contemplate immunity for the 
operation of a nursing home.117 Accordingly, operating a home is not an obligation of 
sovereignty.   
b.  Running a Nursing Home is Not Done For the Common Good of All Citizens 
The nursing home confers a benefit on a small “segment of the population, not 
the state as a whole.”118 R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(b) states a function is governmental if it 
is “carried out for the common good of all of the citizens of the State.”119  A nursing 
                                                                
110 
 § 2744.01(C)(1)(a)-(c) (West 2006). 
111 Starling, No. 75554, 1999 WL 685641, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 2, 1999). 
112 § 2744.01(C)(1)(a) (West 2006). 
113 Starling, 1999 WL 685641, at *2. “The county home is controlled by the Board of 
County Commissioners, not the Department of Human Services. The operation of a county 
home is not within the categories of R.C. 329.04 and 329.05, which statutes list the duties of 
the Department of Human Services.” Id. (Citation omitted.) In other words, the operation of a 
county nursing home is not listed as a duty of the department of human services. Id. 
114 Id. “A courthouse, jail, public comfort station, offices for county officers, and a county 
home shall be provided by the board of county commissioners when, in its judgment, any of 
them are needed.” OHIO REV CODE ANN. § 307.01(A)(West 2006): See also Cramer, 865 
N.E.2d at 15.  
115 Starling, 1999 WL 685641, at *2. 
116 Section 2744.01(C)(2)(m) provides:   “A governmental function includes, the operation 
of a job and family services department or agency, including, but not limited to, the provision 
of assistance to aged and infirm persons and to persons who are indigent.” See, e.g., OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 329.04-05 (West 2006). 
117 Starling, 1999 WL 685641, at * 2. 
118 Id. at *1;  See generally Blakenship v. Enright, 586 N.E.2d 1176, 1181 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1990) (stating proprietary acts  are “performed solely for the benefit of the political 
subdivision's own citizens, not the citizens of the entire state”). 
119 § 2744.01(C)(1)(b). 
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home provides care to those who otherwise cannot take care of themselves. Out of 
Ohio’s approximately 11 million residents only a small segment—80,000—reside in 
nursing homes.120  Therefore, since running a nursing home provides services to less 
than 1% of the population, it is not operated for the common good of all citizens.   
c.  Operation of a Nursing Home is Customarily Engaged in by Private Persons 
It has been argued that the operation of a county home cannot be done by 
nongovernmental persons.121  This argument requires one to look at the formal title 
of a county home.  Even though nongovernmental persons cannot own a county 
home, they can operate a nursing home.122 The Political Subdivision Tort Liability 
Act “does not define a function as governmental based on the type of entity engaged 
in the activities. Rather, the statute looks to the nature of the activities...to determine 
whether a function is governmental.”123 Furthermore, because 90% of nursing homes 
are privately owned, this is an activity customarily operated by private persons.  
In sum, under Ohio law, the operation of a county-owned nursing home is a 
proprietary function.  Under tier one, political subdivisions are generally immune for 
both governmental and proprietary functions, except as set forth at R.C. 
2744.02(B).124  Under tier two, set forth specifically at subsection 2744.02(B)(2), 
political subdivisions are liable in ordinary negligence for acts committed while 
carrying out proprietary functions.  The Ohio Third Appellate District in Cramer 
found that running a county-owned home is a proprietary function, and therefore the 
exception applies.   
2.  The Bill of Rights Expressly Imposes Liability on County Homes, Within the 
Meaning of R.C. 2744.05(B)(5) 
Section 2744.02(B)(5) of the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act states 
that “political subdivisions [are] liable for injury, death, or loss to a person or 
property when civil liability is expressly imposed upon the political subdivision by a 
                                                                
120 United States Census Bureau, supra note 8. 
121 Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 3d Dist. No. 2-04-39, 2005-Ohio-3609, at ¶ 31.The county 
unsuccessfully argued that § 2744.01(C)(1)(c) applied to unlicensed county homes.  Id.  It 
argued that nongovernmental persons could not operate a county home. See also Everett v. 
County of Saginaw, 333 N.W.2d 301, 302-03 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (“In determining whether 
a particular activity constitutes a governmental function, the focus is on the precise activity 
giving rise to plaintiff's claim rather than on the entity's overall or principal operation.”) 
122 Cramer, at ¶ 25; see Greene City Agriculture Soc. v. Liming, 733 N.E.2d 1141, 1149 
(Ohio).  “A central consideration within the structure of R.C. Chapter 2744 is the premise that 
some activities of a political subdivision may be governmental functions, while some other 
activities are not. Thus, the issue here is not whether holding a county fair is a governmental 
function; rather, it is the more specific question of whether conducting the hog show at the 
county fair and conducting the investigation into the allegations of irregularity surrounding the 
entry of Big Fat in that hog show are governmental functions.” Id.  The activity of "conducting 
a livestock competition is an activity customarily engaged in by nongovernmental persons." 
Id. 
123 Cramer, at ¶ 29. 
124 OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2744.02(A)(West 2006).   
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section of the Revised Code.”125  In Cramer, the Supreme Court rejected the lower 
court’s reasoning considering the applicability of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5).126  
The Supreme Court clarified that R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) is available as a remedy for 
nursing home torts sounding in both negligence and intentional tort.127  This 
distinction is important because intentionally tortious conduct on the part of the 
employee could not be actionable against the political subdivision in the absence of 
liability expressly created by statute.  It is also important for the obvious purpose of 
clarifying when a statute expressly imposes liability within the meaning of the 
Political Subdivision Act.   
3.  A County Owned Nursing Home Employee’s Decision on How to Provide 
Medical Care in a Nursing Home as a Discretionary Function 
Under the third tier of the analysis applicable to political subdivisions, the 
Political Subdivision Act re-immunizes political subdivisions for negligent 
discretionary acts.128  Once an act is found to be discretionary, the governmental-
proprietary function is irrelevant.129  Accordingly, a political subdivision is immune 
if it is determined that an “act is both proprietary and discretionary.”130  The Act 
states,  
the political subdivision is immune from liability if the injury, death, or 
loss to person or property resulted from the exercise of judgment or 
discretion in determining whether to acquire, or how to use, equipment, 
supplies, materials, personnel, facilities, and other resources unless the 
judgment or discretion was exercised with malicious purpose, in bad faith, 
or in a wanton or reckless manner.131 
It is well established that in order to determine legislative intent the court must look 
examine the language of the statute.132 Courts cannot ignore the plain and 
unambiguous language of a statute under the “guise of statutory interpretation, but 
                                                                
125 
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02 (West 2006). 
126 Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9, 14 (Ohio 2007).  Cramer also argued that the 
exception to political  subdivision immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) applied to the county 
appellees because Warder's and Green's actions violated R.C. 3721.17(I)(1). The Third District 
characterized this exception as moot and declined to consider it because the county appellees 
were already subject to liability under R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) for any negligent acts.  
127 Id.  (stating, “we do not agree. Unlike sections R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) through (4), R.C. 
2744.02(B)(5) is not limited to negligent actions. Therefore, we must also examine whether 
the exception to immunity pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) applies.”)   
128 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.03(A)(5)(West 2006); Gleason & Van Winkle, supra 
note 30.  Black’s law dictionary defines a discretionary act as “a deed involving an exercise of 
personal judgment and conscience.”  
129 Gleason & Van Winkle, supra note 35. 
130 Id. 
131 OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2744.03(A)(5)(West 2006). 
132 Provident Bank v. Wood, 304 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ohio 1973). 
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must give effect to the words used.”133 Therefore, prior to Cramer, Ohio courts held 
that the exercise of judgment or discretion is a defense available to the political 
subdivision and “not to the actions of employees of the political subdivision.”134  
“Immunity does not apply to the negligence of employees in ‘the details of carrying 
out the activity even though there is discretion in making choices.’”135   
The intermediate court of appeals in Cramer concluded that a political 
subdivision’s employee provision of medical care in a nursing home is a 
discretionary function.136  The court of appeals applied the 2744.03(A)(5) defenses 
directly to the employees themselves, in addition to the home.137   
The Court applied the discretion defense by building on its own prior decision in 
Thompson v. Bagley.138  In Thompson, the court held that a gym teacher providing 
medical care to a drowning student was a discretionary decision and subject to the 
discretionary defense.139  In Thompson, the plaintiffs’ decedent was a fourth grade 
student who drowned during an unstructured portion of his swimming class.140  
When his teacher saw Christopher Thompson lying motionless on the floor of the 
pool, he initially thought Christopher was only pretending.141  The teacher sent three 
children into the pool to try to bring Christopher up, with the third one succeeding.142  
Even with these facts, the Ohio Third District Court of Appeals reached the 
conclusion that the discretionary defense of R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) might apply to the 
                                                                
133 Marcum v. Adkins, No. 93CA17, 1994 WL 116233, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 28, 
2004); Erb v. Erb, 747 N.E.2d 230 (Ohio 2001). 
134 Kiep v. City of Hamilton, No. CA96-08-158, 1997 WL 264236 (Ohio Ct. App. May 19, 
1997) (stating “R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) immunity extends only to the ‘exercise of judgment or 
discretion’ of a political subdivision as defined by 2744.01(F) and not to the actions of 
employees of the political subdivision. … If R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) immunity was extended in a 
broad manner to include subdivision employees, the liability provisions of R.C. 2744.03(B) 
would have no force.);  see McVey v. City of Cincinnati, 671 N.E.2d 1288, 1290 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1995) (stating that immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) does not apply to the negligence 
of employees in "the details of carrying out the activity even though there is discretion in 
making choices"); Hallett v. Stow Bd. of Edn., 624 N.E.2d 272, 274 (Ohio Ct. App. 9 Dist. 
1993)(stating  the “exceptions to liability found in R.C. 2744.03 must be read more narrowly 
than the exceptions to non-liability found in R.C. 2744.02(B) in order for the structure chosen 
by the legislature to make sense.”) 
135 McVey, 671 N.E.2d at 1290.  
136 Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 3d Dist. No. 2-04-39, 2005-Ohio-3609, at ¶ 40. (Nurses’ 
“decision regarding how to move Mr. Cramer into bed and their reaction to his subsequent fall 
are examples of...discretionary actions.”) 
137 Id.  
138 Thompson v. Bagley, No. 11-04-12, 2005 WL 940872(Ohio Ct. App. April 25, 2005). 
139 Id.  at *11. 
140 Id. at *1.   
141 Id.  
142 Id.  
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Thompsons’ claims against the school, because the teacher has some discretion as to 
how to attend to his drowning student.143  
By contrast, the school was not entitled to invoke the same provision, R.C. 
2744.03(A)(5), as a defense to the Thompsons’ claims based on the school’s 
negligent maintenance or operation of the pool.144  The Third District reasoned that a 
provision of the Ohio Administrative Code defined the school’s maintenance and 
operational requirements.145  Thompson v. Bagley was one of the principal cases 
relied upon by the same appellate district one year later, when the Third District 
court decided Cramer.146  However, the fact that the Nursing Home Bill of Rights 
enumerates and guarantees more than 30 specific rights, statutorily, did not enter into 
the court’s analysis in Cramer.   
The purpose of a nursing home is to provide medical care.  Nursing home 
residents are statutorily guaranteed the right to “adequate and appropriate medical 
treatment and nursing care...consistent with the program.” 147  If a political 
subdivision employee does not have the discretion to disregard the directives of the 
Ohio Administrative Code, it is not clear that political subdivision employees have 
the discretion to disregard the directives of the Ohio Revised Code.  Courts should 
not recognize any “discretion” to deviate from the requirements of statutory law. 
In Cramer, the employees followed policy by using a Hoyer lift148 to attempt to 
transfer Frank Cramer into his bed. Two employees used the lift.149  The appellant’s 
position was that Frank Cramer was dropped because of the nurses’ careless transfer 
of the patient.  Nothing in the record of the case suggested that the nurses were, at 
the moment they dropped Mr. Cramer, making any choice about which way to use 
the Hoyer lift.   
In the Supreme Court, the appellant, Mr. Cramer’s administrator, argued that the 
employees’ discretion ended when they decided to use the Hoyer lift.150  After that 
point, contended the appellant, the use of the lift was merely the execution of a 
decision already taken, with no act of discretion remaining in the carrying out of this 
work.  This argument was also advanced in the lower court. The Third District court 
                                                                
143 Id. at *11. 
144 Thompson, at *10. 
145 Id. at *9-10, citing OHIO ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 3701-31 (2003). 
146 Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 3d Dist. No. 2-04-39, 2005-Ohio-3609. 
147 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.13(A)(3)(West 2006). 
148 A Hoyer lift is a lift-sling apparatus used to transfer patients.  See Cramer v. Auglaize 
Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9. 
149 Brief of Amicus Curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers Urging Affirmance on behalf 
of Plaintiff, Appellant, Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9 (Ohio 2007) (hereinafter 
Merit Brief for Apppelant); but see Merit Brief of Appellees Auglaize Acres, et al. at 6, 
Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9 (Ohio 2007) (No. 2005-1629) stating only that Mr. 
Cramer “fell forward” in the lift.  The Merit Brief of Appellant details the nurses’ notes 
initially stating that Mr. Cramer “leaned” forward.  A nursing supervisor changed the word 
“leaned” to “lunged,” despite not having witnessed the fall.  Merit Brief for Appellant, supra 
note 149, at 2-3. 
150 Merit Brief for Appellant, supra note 149, at 11. 
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seemed to differentiate the choice of how to move Mr. Cramer and how to treat his 
injury after the fall, from the act of dropping him once the choice was made to use 
the Hoyer lift.151  Nonetheless, that court held that the choice to use the lift, their act 
of moving him after the fall, and the lack of attention to him after the incident 
involved “discretion in determining whether to acquire, or how to use, equipment, 
supplies, materials, personnel, facilities, and other resources.”152  Thus, by 
considering the employees’ actions before and after the moment of the drop, 
discretionary actions were found in a case that appears to arise from a simple drop 
from a lift.   
The Supreme Court held similarly: 
R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) restores a political subdivision's immunity if "the 
injury, death, or loss to person or property resulted from the exercise of 
judgment or discretion in determining whether to acquire, or how to use, 
equipment, supplies, materials, personnel, facilities, and other resources 
unless the judgment or discretion was exercised with malicious purpose, 
in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner." Cramer argues that as a 
matter of law, the defense in R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) is not available to the 
county appellees. He concedes that Green and Warder had discretion to 
decide whether to use the Hoyer lift to put Frank in bed. But once the 
nurses decided to use the lift, Cramer maintains, there was no discretion 
left because there is only one method for using it. Cramer also contends 
that after Frank fell, the nurses failed to follow Auglaize Acre's policy 
regarding falls. 
We do not agree that the decision to use the Hoyer lift is the only 
discretionary act involved, for the nurses' treatment decisions concerning 
Frank are also discretionary. Furthermore, the proper method for using the 
Hoyer lift and the issue of whether the nurses properly followed the 
home's policy concerning patient falls are also disputed. Because there are 
material issues of fact as to whether the nurses acted maliciously, in bad 
faith, wantonly, or recklessly, we cannot say as a matter of law that R.C. 
2744.03(A)(5) is inapplicable in this case. Resolution of these questions 
will be for the fact finder to decide.153 
The decision to use the Hoyer lift and the subsequent decisions regarding how to 
respond to Mr. Cramer’s fall are distinct from the moment that Mr. Cramer was 
dropped.  Further, it is not clear from the parties’ briefs in what way the “proper 
method for using the Hoyer lift” was disputed.154  Put simply, if a discretionary act is 
                                                                
151 Cramer, at ¶ 40. “[The [nurses’] decision regarding how to move Frank into bed and 
their reaction to his subsequent fall are examples of...discretionary actions.” Id. See OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN.§ 2744.03(A)(5)(West 2006). 
152 Id. at ¶ 42.  
153 Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9, 17 (Ohio 2007).  
154 Id. See, supra  note 144, at *17 (“The decision of Appellees’ … regarding how to move 
Appellant’s decedent into bed and their reaction to his subsequent fall are clear examples of a 
discretionary exercise of judgment.” )  
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found among these facts, it is difficult to imagine a set of facts where there is no 
employee discretion involved.   
Under the Nursing Home Bill of Rights, the fact remains that the statute is 
designed to make all negligent acts actionable, not solely those acts that rise to the 
level of being reckless or wanton.155  By recognizing that the Nursing Home Bill of 
Rights falls within the meaning of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5), the Ohio Supreme Court 
corrected an error that was important to rectify.  But by then holding that the 
discretionary defenses under 2744.03(A)(5) might apply to these facts, the same 
court raised the bar for nursing home patients residing in county homes from 
ordinary negligence to recklessness.  While residents of every other home may hold 
providers accountable for negligence, residents of county homes will only be able to 
take action for reckless acts, so long as some act of discretion is identified.   
To say discretion might be found either in the act of dropping a patient, or in the 
failure to determine that the patient had suffered a broken leg until five hours after 
his fall, is a strained construction of R.C. 2744.03(A)(5).  If Ohio’s Nursing Home 
Bill of Rights is intended to ensure anything, it is intended to ensure that medical 
care is provided in nursing homes.  By finding the possibility of some exercise of 
discretion in the employees’ actions, the Ohio Supreme Court took a long step away 
from the protections of the Nursing Home Bill of Rights, in regards to nursing home 
residents who happen to live in county homes.   
4.  The Nursing Home Bill of Rights Expressly Imposes Liability On Persons, But 
Not Employees 
In both the Third Appellate District and the Supreme Court, the Cramer courts 
found a distinction between the word “employee” as it appears in Chapter 27, and 
“person” as it appears in Chapter 37 of the Revised Code.  Under the Supreme 
Court’s ruling, this distinction absolves the employees of county homes from all 
liability, regardless of the cause of action created in the Bill of Rights against any 
“person or home.”156 
In the court of appeals, the Third District court reversed the trial court, stating the 
Nursing Home Bill of Rights statute does not expressly impose liability upon 
employees of political subdivisions.157  The court held that a “statute imposing 
general sanctions on everyone rather than a group of specific individuals… is not a 
statute that expressly imposes liability upon employees of a political subdivision.”158  
                                                                
155 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.17(I)(2)(a)(West 2006). (“The plaintiff also may recover 
compensatory damages based upon a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
violation of the resident's rights resulted from a negligent act or omission of the person or 
home and that the violation was the proximate cause of the resident's injury, death, or loss to 
person or property.”). 
156 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.17(I)(1)(a)(West 2006).   
157 Cramer, at ¶ 52(stating that the NHBOR imposes liability upon ‘homes and all persons 
in general, but not employees”). 
158 Id.; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.01(B)(West 2006) (defining an employee as 
an “officer, agent, employee, or servant, whether or not compensated or full-time or part-time, 
who is authorized to act and is acting within the scope of the officer's, agent's, employee's, or 
servant's employment for a political subdivision”). 
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The court relied on its own earlier holding in Thompson.159  In this way, the Cramer 
court of appeals distinguished the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Campbell v. 
Burton, in which the Supreme Court recognized that Ohio’s statute requiring school 
personnel to report abuse expressly implied liability under the Political Subdivision 
act.160  By contrast, the court of appeals stated the Nursing Home Bill of Rights 
imposed liability on all persons in general, but not specifically employees.161 
Therefore, the court held that a statute that imposed general sanctions on everyone 
rather than a group of specific individuals does not expressly impose liability on 
political subdivision employees.162 
The Nursing Home Bill of Rights expressly states, “any resident whose 
rights...are violated has a cause of action against any person or home committing the 
violation.”163 This act sets out thirty five rights of the nursing home resident.  Only 
persons working for or owning the home are capable of violating these rights.  
However, the Ohio Supreme Court holds that Ohio’s Nursing Home Bill of Rights 
does not expressly impose liability on the employees of the county nursing home.164 
The Nursing Home Bill of Rights is not a general sanction on all persons in 
general; it is only applicable to the people who are capable of violating a nursing 
home resident’s rights while within the home.165   For instance, Frank Cramer, a 
nursing home resident, fell while being assisted into bed by nurses employed by the 
                                                                
159 Cramer, at ¶ 52 (citing Ratcliff v. Darby, No. 02CA2832, 2002 WL 31721942 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2002) (distinguishing Campbell v. Burton, 750 N.E.2d 539 (2001) as a 
“unique and narrow” decision)).   
160 Campbell v. Burton, 750 N.E.2d 539 (2001).  In this case, parent of a student brought 
an action against a peer mediator and the city school board for not reporting known or 
suspected abuse as mandated by statute. Id.  The Ohio Supreme Court held the statute 
mandating the reporting of known or suspected child abuse expressly imposes liability within 
meaning of Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act. Id.   
161 Cramer, at ¶ 52. 
162 Id. 
163 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.17(I)(1)(a)(West 2006). 
164 Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9, 14, 16-17 (Ohio 2007).  “Any resident whose 
rights under sections 3721.10 to 3721.17 of the Revised Code are violated has a cause of 
action against any person or home committing the violation." Appellees argue that R.C. 
3721.17(I)(1) does not satisfy the requirements of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) or 2744.03(A)(6)(c) by 
expressly imposing liability on either the county appellees or their employees . . . Appellees 
contend that R.C. 3721.17(I)(1) is a statute that imposes general sanctions against everyone 
rather than against a political subdivision or its employees. The court of appeals determined 
that the use of the term "person" in R.C. 3721.17(I)(1) was too general to expressly impose 
liability on an employee of a political subdivision. Unlike the term "home," the term "person" 
is not defined in the Patients' Bill of Rights. Under R.C. 3721.13 , certain patients' rights--such 
as the right to adequate and appropriate medical treatment and nursing care and the right to 
communicate with the home's physician and employees in planning treatment or care--involve 
the conduct of nursing home employees, but there is no express statement that the employees 
of a county nursing home will be liable individually for violations of the Patients' Bill of 
Rights. 
165 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3721.10-3721.19. 
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home.166  Despite being in pain, he was put to bed and not checked upon until five 
hours later by another nurse employed by the home.  These acts clearly denied Mr. 
Cramer adequate medical care as protected by §§ 3721.10-3721.19. The only persons 
who could violate Frank Cramer’s right to adequate care were the nurses assigned to 
him.  
In Campbell, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a statute did expressly impose 
liability on persons for the failure to report suspected child abuse.167  The statute at 
issue here stated, “No person described in division (A)(1)(b) of this section who is 
acting in an official or professional capacity and knows, or has reasonable cause to 
suspect abuse or neglect of the child shall fail to immediately report that 
knowledge.”  Division (A)(1)(b) of this section sets out almost fifty different persons 
ranging from an attorney to a dentist.168  This list was required because children 
come into contact with a wide variety of treatment providers, other caregivers, and 
educators.  The intent of the statute was to make all persons who shared a special 
relationship with the child accountable for the child’s well-being.  The Supreme 
Court stated that the Ohio General Assembly enacted this statute to “safeguard 
children from abuse.”169  The Court stated only the state and its political subdivisions 
can protect children from abuse.   
In the same way, nursing home residents “are almost entirely dependent upon 
nursing homes to ensure the[ir] safety.”170  In Cramer, the Ohio Supreme Court even 
                                                                
166 Id. at 10. 
167 Campbell, 750 N.E.2d at 544.   
168 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42(A)(1)(b)(West 2006).  “[A]ny person who is an 
attorney; physician, including a hospital intern or resident; dentist; podiatrist; practitioner of a 
limited branch of medicine as specified in section 4731.15 of the Revised Code; registered 
nurse; licensed practical nurse; visiting nurse; other health care professional; licensed 
psychologist; licensed school psychologist; independent marriage and family therapist or 
marriage and family therapist; speech pathologist or audiologist; coroner; administrator or 
employee of a child day-care center; administrator or employee of a residential camp or child 
day camp; administrator or employee of a certified child care agency or other public or private 
children services agency; school teacher; school employee; school authority; person engaged 
in social work or the practice of professional counseling; agent of a county humane society; 
person, other than a cleric, rendering spiritual treatment through prayer in accordance with the 
tenets of a well-recognized religion; superintendent, board member, or employee of a county 
board of mental retardation; investigative agent contracted with by a county board of mental 
retardation; employee of the department of mental retardation and developmental disabilities; 
employee of a facility or home that provides respite care in accordance with section 5123.171 
of the Revised Code; employee of a home health agency; employee of an entity that provides 
homemaker services; a person performing the duties of an assessor pursuant to Chapter 3107 
or 5103 of the Revised Code; or third party employed by a public children services agency to 
assist in providing child or family related services.” 
169 Campbell, 750 N.E.2d at 544 (stating the concern in enacting the statute was for the 
protection of children from abuse, not political subdivisions and their employees).  “In many 
instances, only the state and its political subdivisions can protect children from abuse. 
Additionally, we have found that children services agencies must protect children from abuse 
and eliminate the source of any such abuse. Thus, it is clear that the concern of the General 
Assembly in enacting R.C. 2151.421 was not political subdivisions or their employees, but the 
protection of children from abuse and neglect.” Id. 
170 ABUSE OF RESIDENTS, supra note 10, at 1. 
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cited Campbell as part of its support for finding that R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) applied to 
county owned nursing homes.171  However the same reasoning did not apply to R.C. 
2744.03(A)(6)(c), which would impose liability on the individual employees.   
Later in the very same term, the Ohio Supreme Court repeated the long-standing 
and obvious fact that political subdivisions can only act through their employees: 
We have held and it is well recognized that a political subdivision acts 
through its employees. In Spires v. Lancaster (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 76, 28 
OBR 173 502 N.E.2d 614, we stated, "'It is undeniable that the state can 
only act through its employees and officers.'" . . . Because a school district 
can act only through its employees, R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) affords a defense 
to liability. In this instance, Elston's injury resulted from the judgment or 
discretion of the coach in determining how to use equipment or facilities. 
No claim is presented suggesting reckless conduct. Thus, the school 
district successfully asserted this defense in this instance.172 
The Nursing Home Bill of Rights does not place liability on persons in general.173 
The rights guaranteed under the act strictly apply to a resident confined within a 
nursing home. Therefore, the specific rights by themselves expressly limit who can 
be liable.  For example, residents have the right to a safe and clean living 
environment.174  The responsibility to keep a nursing home safe and clean is limited 
to the staff employed there.  The resident has the right to have clothes and bed sheets 
changed as the need arises, to ensure the resident's comfort or sanitation.175  
Individuals in general are not responsible for this.  Employees of the home whose job 
description mandates personal care of residents are responsible for this. Residents 
also have the right to adequate and appropriate medical treatment and nursing care.176  
Again, the only persons who can violate this right are the medical personal hired by 
the home to care for and treat residents within the home.  These rights expressly limit 
the group of persons that can be held responsible for violations of a resident’s rights. 
The Nursing Home Bill of Rights defines certain rights.  It provides that if any of 
these rights are violated the resident has a cause of action against the person or home 
violating the right.177  In Cramer, both nurses were employees of the county owned 
nursing home. Furthermore, prior to this fall, the home had implemented a fall policy 
for Mr. Cramer, stating he should not be moved if he fell.178   Mr. Cramer’s right to 
“adequate and appropriate” medical treatment was violated when the nurses dropped 
                                                                
171 Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9, 16 (Ohio 2007).    
172 Elston v. Howland Local Sch., 865 N.E.2d 845, 849-50 (Ohio 2007). 
173 Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 3d Dist. No. 2-04-39, 2005-Ohio-3609, at ¶ 52. 
174 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.13(A)(1)(West 2006). 
175 § 3721.13(A)(5). 
176 § 3721.13(A)(3). 
177 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.17(I)(1)(a)(West 2006). 
178 Merit Brief for Appellant, supra note 149. “The defendant county home, prior to Frank 
Cramer's fall from the Hoyer lift, adopted a "Fall Policy" that was introduced into evidence as 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 17. It provided that when Frank's fall and injury occurred that the attending 
nurses not move him.” Id. 
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him.179  The nurses then moved him, thereby violating his right to adequate and 
appropriate care again.  
As the same court later recognized in Elston v. Howland Local Schools, a 
political subdivision cannot act at all except through its employees.180  When a 
political subdivision runs a home, its employees carry out the work.  The Ohio 
Supreme Court’s conclusion that Mr. Cramer’s nurses, as political subdivision 
employees, are not “persons” within the meaning of the Nursing Home Bill of Rights 
is unsupportable.   
5.  Employees of a Political Subdivision Are Liable Under 2744.03(A)(6)(b) for 
Reckless Actions 
The immunities and liabilities of political subdivisions and their employees are 
specified in different sections of the Political Subdivision Act.  Section 
2744.03(A)(6)(b) sets out specific situations where an employee’s immunity will be 
assessed, without regard to the three-tiered analysis applicable to the subdivision 
itself.181 Ultimately an employee will be liable if his actions were undertaken with 
malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.182  Malicious 
purpose is defined as a willful and intentional act designed to cause injury.183 Bad 
faith means “a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, [and] conscious wrongdoing.”184 
In other words, this means “breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive or 
ill will partaking of the nature of fraud.  Wanton misconduct is established where a 
person fails to exercise any care whatsoever.”185  Recklessness exists where a person 
“knowingly and unreasonably opt[s] for a course of conduct that entail[s] a 
substantially greater…risk than the available alternatives”186  Because these levels of 
scienter are set forth in the disjunctive, recklessness is the lowest standard to 
demonstrate liability. Thus as a general rule, political subdivision employees are 
liable in their individual capacities so long as their conduct is adjudged to be, at a 
minimum, reckless.   
However, the Supreme Court apparently disregarded this aspect of the Third 
District’s holding entirely, when the Court stated categorically, “[t]hus, Cramer has 
no cause of action against the nurses under the Patients’ Bill of Rights.”187  The court 
made this statement concerning only R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c), which is the section 
imposing liability directly on employees when another section of the Revised Code 
prescribes it.  Based on the person/employee distinction described above, the 
Supreme Court agreed with the Third District Court, and found that subsection 
                                                                
179 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.13(A)(3)(West 2006). 
180 Elston v. Howland Local Sch., 865 N.E.2d 845, 849-50 (Ohio 2007). 
181 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b)(West 2006).   
182 Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 3d Dist. No. 2-04-39, 2005-Ohio-3609, at ¶ 41. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 515 (6th Cir.  2002).  
187 Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9, 17 (Ohio 2007).  
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(A)(6)(c) does not apply.188  The Supreme Court’s opinion made no reference at all to 
the (A)(6)(b) subsection, which separately imposes liability on employees for any 
conduct arising to the level of recklessness, or worse.  The Supreme Court’s 
categorical statement that “Cramer has no cause of action against the nurses under 
the Patients’ Bill of Rights,” is contrary to the plain language of the Bill of Rights, 
the Political Subdivision Act, and the lower court’s holding in Cramer.   
Employees’ immunity is only assessed under section 2744.03(A)(6).189 Whether 
the nurses were acting within any discretion is not at issue under this portion of the 
Political Subdivision act.  Section 2744.03 clearly states that a political 
subdivision—not the employee-- will be immune from a liability arising out of 
discretionary act.   
The Supreme Court in Cramer correctly concluded that there was a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether the nurses “acted maliciously, in bad faith, wantonly, 
or recklessly” within the meaning of R.C. 2744.03(A)(5).190  But, as set forth above, 
the only reason this standard was applied was to set the parameters for the 
“discretionary acts” defense available to the political subdivision.  The Ohio 
Supreme Court had facts before it suggesting liability under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b), 
but simply overlooked this portion of the statute.  The Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling 
will likely breed confusion now that it has stated categorically that there is no cause 
of action against employees of a county home.        
6.  Adams v. Gables: the Cramer Court Retreats From the Broad Application of the 
Discretionary Defense 
Only a year prior to Adams, the Cramer court was quick to apply § 
2744.03(A)(5) to the employees of the political subdivision without mentioning any 
policy governing how patients were to be transferred.191 However in Adams, with 
Cramer pending in the Ohio Supreme Court, the Third District court appeared more 
cautious.  The court first set out the conflicting arguments for the applicability of the 
discretionary defense: 
The Gables claims that the defense in R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) applies, which 
provides: The political subdivision is immune from liability if the injury, 
                                                                
188 Id. Note that the Supreme Court erroneously cited only subsection 2744.03(A)(6)(a), 
which imposes liability on employees for tortious acts that are manifestly outside the scope of 
their employment.  It is otherwise clear from the context of paragraph 32 that the Court was 
speaking of the (c) subsection, governing liability imposed by other sections of the revised 
code.   
189 Id. at 13; see also Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 3d Dist. No. 2-04-39, 2005-Ohio-3609. 
190 Id. at 17; “After reviewing the entire record, we find that there is a material issue of fact 
concerning whether Green and Warder acted maliciously, in bad faith, wantonly, or recklessly. 
Cramer's complaint and the affidavit of at least one expert allege that Green and Warder 
purposefully concealed Frank's injury and falsified his medical records in an effort to cover up 
their negligence. The affidavit also alleges that Green and Warder's intentional actions caused 
Frank to suffer undue pain for approximately five hours. Moreover, there is at least some 
circumstantial evidence supporting these allegations. Thus, a material issue of fact remains 
concerning whether Green and Warder's actions rose to the level of malice, bad faith, 
wantonness, or recklessness.”   
191 Cramer, at ¶ 41. 
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death, or loss to persons or property resulted from the exercise of 
judgment or discretion in determining whether to acquire, or how to use, 
equipment, supplies, materials, personnel, facilities, and other resources 
unless the judgment or discretion was exercised with malicious purpose, 
in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. Adams responds that, 
under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5), immunity for discretionary decisions only 
applies to political subdivisions themselves and not to individual 
employees. Thus, Adams argues that The Gables' employees were 
required to implement an acute fall care plan pursuant to The Gables' own 
discretionary policy, and failure by The Gables' employees to do so does 
not fit within the discretion encompassed by the section R.C. 
2744.03(A)(5) defense.192 
The court then avoided the issue of whether an employee has any discretion to go 
against her employer’s policies by stating, “the record provides little evidence that a 
[fall care plan] policy existed.193  From this statement the court held that a decision 
“regarding an exercise of discretion is… premature.”194 However, documentation of 
Nannie Martin’s fall assessment was admitted into evidence and stated an acute fall 
care plan was to be implemented.195  For now, it is an open question whether and to 
what extent providing medical care in a nursing home remains a discretionary 
function.   
In the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cramer, the court was willing to entertain the 
possibility of discretion being found in the acts of dropping a patient, and failing to 
diagnose his broken leg for five hours.  By contrast, in Adams, decided December 
26, 2006, the same appellate court that decided Cramer sidestepped its own earlier 
holding.196 In Adams, Nannie Martin was determined to be at high risk for falling.197  
This determination required that an “Acute Fall Care Plan” be initiated.198  The court 
affirmed the denial of summary judgment to the county nursing home because the 
home had not produced any evidence about its policies or procedures while seeking 
summary judgment.  Therefore in Adams, the Third Appellate District needed to see 
more about the policies applicable to employee discretion.  This attention to the 
home’s specific procedures may indicate a retreat from the same court’s willingness 
to find discretion in Cramer.   
                                                                
192 Adams v. Gables at Green Pastures Nursing Home, No. 14-06-33, 2006 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 6757, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2006). 
193 Id. at *10-11. 
194 Id.  at *11.   
195 Id. at 4; based on the patient’s “Fall Risk/Alarm Assessment,”  the plaintiff’s nursing 
expert averred that the nursing home failed to implement Nannie Martin’s acute fall care plan.  
196 Adams, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6757. 
197 Id. at *3-4. 
198 Id. at *4. 
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III.  CAN THE GOVERNMENT OPERATE A NURSING HOME WITHOUT CREATING A 
CONFLICT OF POLICY? 
A.  The Nursing Home Bill of Rights Allows Punitive Damages, the Ohio Political 
Subdivision Tort Liability Act Does Not 
Under the Nursing Home Bill of Rights, if compensatory damages are awarded 
for a violation of the resident's rights, section 2315.21 of the Revised Code applies to 
award plaintiff punitive damages.199  The Bill of Rights specifically provides for 
punitive damages as a means of enforcing the protections enacted in the Bill.  But 
under the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, the plaintiff may only recover his 
or her actual losses incurred through compensatory damages.200  The Political 
Subdivision Act does not allow an injured plaintiff to recover any punitive 
damages.201  The Act also caps the damages available for “non-actual” loss, except 
for wrongful death claimants.202   
                                                                
199 OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  § 3721.17(I)(2)(b)(West 2006). 
200 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.05(C)(1)(West 2006) provides:  “There shall not be any 
limitation on compensatory damages that represent the actual loss of the person who is 
awarded the damages.”  §2744.05(c)(2)(a)-(f) provides:  
the actual loss of the person who is awarded the damages includes all of the 
following:(a) all wages, salaries, or other compensation lost by the person injured as a 
result of the injury, including wages, salaries, or other compensation lost as of the date 
of a judgment and future expected lost earnings of the person injured; (b) All 
expenditures of the person injured or another person on behalf of the person injured 
for medical care or treatment, for rehabilitation services, or for other care, treatment, 
services, products, or accommodations that were necessary because of the injury;(c) 
All expenditures to be incurred in the future, as determined by the court, by the person 
injured or another person on behalf of the person injured for medical care or treatment, 
for rehabilitation services, or for other care, treatment, services, products, or 
accommodations that will be necessary because of the injury; (d) All expenditures of a 
person whose property was injured or destroyed or of another person on behalf of the 
person whose property was injured or destroyed in order to repair or replace the 
property that was injured or destroyed; (e) All expenditures of the person injured or of 
the person whose property was injured or destroyed or of another person on behalf of 
the person injured or of the person whose property was injured or destroyed in relation 
to the actual preparation or presentation of the claim involved; (f) Any other 
expenditures of the person injured or of the person whose property was injured or 
destroyed or of another person on behalf of the person injured or of the person whose 
property was injured or destroyed that the court determines represent an actual loss 
experienced because of the personal or property injury or property loss.  
201 § 2744.05(A). “Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Revised Code or rules of a 
court to the contrary, in an action against a political subdivision to recover damages for injury, 
death, or loss to person or property caused by an act or omission in connection with a 
governmental or proprietary function, punitive or exemplary damages shall not be awarded.” 
Id. 
202 § 2744.05 (C)(1).  
  There shall not be any limitation on compensatory damages that represent the actual 
loss of the person who is awarded the damages. However, except in wrongful death 
actions brought pursuant to Chapter 2125. of the Revised Code, damages that arise 
from the same cause of action, transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or 
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B.  Punitive Damages Make the County Tax Payers Ultimately Responsible 
The policy behind the statutory refusal to permit awards of punitive damages 
against political subdivisions is well-established.  Any award of punitive damages 
against a county, township, or city is contrary to public policy because the burden of 
a punitive damages award falls upon the taxpayers of the county.203  The award of 
punitive damages against a county would result in the citizens being punished for the 
acts of public officials.204  Punitive damages “involve a blending of the interests of 
society and those of [aggrieved individuals].”205 The purpose of punitive damages is 
not to compensate the injured party, but to punish and deter certain conduct.206   
Compensatory damages do not create the same dilemma.  The municipality, 
which is able to spread the burden of the cost of an injury among its taxpaying 
residents, “is in a much better position… than the injured individual.”207 In Haas v. 
Hayslip, the Ohio Supreme Court stated, 
if the burden of damages must be imposed, it is much fairer that it be 
imposed on a municipality than on the victim… [C]ities and states are 
active and virile creatures, capable of inflicting real harm and their civil 
liability should be co-extensive...if the city operates or maintains injury-
inducing activities or conditions, the harm thus caused should be viewed 
as a part of the normal and proper cost of public administration and not as 
a diversion of public funds. The city is a far better loss-distributing agency 
that the innocent and injured victim.208 
 County owned nursing homes therefore cannot be subjected to this 
remedy made available to residents of privately owned homes.  The result 
is that the deterrence created by an award of punitive damages—as well as 
by the possibility of an award of punitive damages—is not applicable to 
county owned nursing homes. 
                                                          
occurrences and that do not represent the actual loss of the person who is awarded the 
damages shall not exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars in favor of any one 
person. The limitation on damages that do not represent the actual loss of the person 
who is awarded the damages provided in this division does not apply to court costs 
that are awarded to a plaintiff, or to interest on a judgment rendered in favor of a 
plaintiff, in an action against a political subdivision.  
203 Kline v. Kansas City Fire Dept., 175 F.3d 660, 669-70 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that 
because the burden of a punitive damages award against a municipality ultimately falls on the 
taxpayers, and thus will fail to deter future harmful activity by the municipality itself, punitive 
damages are not usually recoverable against a municipality.) 
204 Id. 
205 25 C.J.S. Damages § 195 (2006). 
206 Id.; see BMW v. Gore,  517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (“[P]unitive damages may 
properly be imposed to further State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and 
deterring its repetition.”) 
207 Hack v. City of Salem, 189 N.E.2d 857, 868 (Ohio 1963). 
208 Haas v. Hayslip, 364 N.E.2d 1376, 1382 (Ohio 1977)(Braum, J., dissenting). 
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IV.  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO PROTECT RESIDENTS OF COUNTY OWNED NURSING 
HOMES 
A.  Amend the Nursing Home Bill of Rights to Clearly Impose Liability on Employees 
The Nursing Home Bill of Rights expressly imposes liability on any person or 
home violating a resident’s rights.  The first section of the Nursing Home Bill of 
Rights defines the words of the statute.209  The statute defines home as “an 
institution, residence, or facility that provides, for a period of more than twenty-four 
hours accommodations to three or more unrelated individuals who are dependent 
upon the services of others, including a nursing home, residential care facility, home 
for the aging, and a veterans' home.”210  Home also means “[a] county home or 
district home that is or has been licensed as a residential care facility.”211  However, 
the word person is not defined or limited.212   
To impose liability on the home’s employee’s, Ohio’s General Assembly could 
make one of three changes to the statute to impose liability on all employees and 
nursing homes.  First, the  legislature could add the term “person” to the list of 
definitions.213  Here the General Assembly could specifically name what persons 
would be liable for violations of the resident’s rights. Second, the legislature could 
replace the word person with “employee of the home.”  This simple change in words 
would clearly impose liability on all employees of the nursing home, without 
changing the apparent intent of the statute.  Neither the courts nor the parties to 
actions against nursing homes or their employees would then be required to 
distinguish the rights and remedies available against county home and the persons 
who work in them from those of any other nursing home.   
B.  Ohio Can Waive its Immunity from Liability of All County Owned Nursing Homes 
Section 2743.02(B) of the Ohio revised Code waives political subdivision 
immunity for all hospitals214 owned or operated by one or more political subdivisions 
                                                                
209 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.01(A)(1) (West 2006). 
210 
 § 3721.01(A)(1)(a). 
211 
 § 3721.01(A)(1)(a)(b)(ii). 
212 See e.g. Campbell v. Burton,750 N.E.2d 539 (Ohio2001)(superseded by statute). 
213 Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9, 16 (Ohio 2007) (finding that while the Bill of 
Rights applied to impose liability on the subdivision because “home” was defined, the same 
did not hold true for employees because “person” was not defined in the Bill of Rights.   
214 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3727.01(C)(2) (West 2006)  provides:  
As used in this chapter, "hospital" means an institution classified as a hospital under 
section 3701.07 of the Revised Code in which are provided to inpatients diagnostic, 
medical, surgical, obstetrical, psychiatric, or rehabilitation care for a continuous period 
longer than twenty-four hours or a hospital operated by a health maintenance 
organization. "Hospital" does not include a facility licensed under Chapter 3721. of 
the Revised Code, a health care facility operated by the department of mental health or 
the department of mental retardation and developmental disabilities, a health 
maintenance organization that does not operate a hospital, the office of any private 
licensed health care professional, whether organized for individual or group practice, 
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and permits them to be sued.215 This statute allows the political subdivision’s liability 
to be determined by the court.  The court will apply the same rules and law that is 
applicable to a private hospital. 
A nursing home is not considered a hospital under Ohio Revised Code § 
3727.01(C)(2).216   However, in the same way the state could easily waive its 
immunity from all nursing homes.  This would allow all resident to sue county 
owned nursing homes and their employees when their rights were violated. 
Accordingly, all residents of nursing homes would be protected under the same laws.   
C.  County Homes Should Disclose the Limited Applicability of the Nursing Home 
Bill of Rights 
The simplest way to move toward the equal protection of all citizens of Ohio 
living in nursing homes is through disclosure.  There are fifty-four government 
homes in the state of Ohio.217  These homes offer over five thousand beds for Ohio 
residents.218  Only twenty seven of these homes identify themselves as county homes 
in their name.  Many homes such as Wood Haven Health Care Senior Living and 
Putnam Acres Care Center give no indication that they are operated by the county.  
Homes that do not identify themselves as county operated must disclose this 
information to incoming residents.   
Currently, the Nursing Home Bill of Rights mandates that administrators of 
“homes”219  furnish every resident with a copy of the rights established under the 
Nursing Home Bill of Rights including a written explanation of the provisions of the 
act and a copy of the individual nursing home’s policies and procedures.220 When a 
home provides a resident with a copy of his rights and then an explanation of the 
                                                          
or a clinic that provides ambulatory patient services and where patients are not 
regularly admitted as inpatients.  
215 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3743.02(B)(West 2006) provides:  
The state hereby waives the immunity from liability of all hospitals owned or operated 
by one or more political subdivisions and consents for them to be sued, and to have 
their liability determined, in the court of common pleas, in accordance with the same 
rules of law applicable to suits between private parties, subject to the limitations set 
forth in this chapter. This division is also applicable to hospitals owned or operated by 
political subdivisions which have been determined by the supreme court to be subject 
to suit prior to July 28, 1975.  
216 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3727.01(C)(2)(West 2006).  “Hospital does not include a 
facility licensed under Chapter 3721 of the Revised Code.” 
217 See supra note 9. 
218 State of Ohio, Long Term Care Consumer Guide [hereinafter Consumer Guide].  
http://www.ltc.ohio.gov/consumer/compoundsearchresults.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).  This 
comprehensive guide sets out 970 of Ohio’s nursing homes.  The guide offers up to date 
information on the homes including the most recent inspection report. Id.  The guide does not 
differentiate between government and privately owned homes. Id. 
219 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.01(a)(1)(a)-(b)(ii)(West 2006). A home is defined “a 
facility that provides… [housing] to three or more unrelated individuals who are dependent 
upon the services of others, including a nursing home, residential care facility, home for the 
aging,” and a  county home facility. 
220 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.12(A)(1)(3)(a)-(c)(West 2006). 
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provisions of the act, a reasonable person would assume he had these protections.  
However, where any act of discretion can be found, residents of county homes are 
not protected from negligent acts or omissions.  Until a change is made to protect all 
nursing home residents, those who are unprotected must be correctly informed.221  
Upon admission, all county home residents would be required to read a statement 
telling them they give up the protections of the Nursing Home Bill of Rights by 
residing in the home.  Furthermore, they must sign a statement acknowledging that if 
the county home violates the resident’s rights, he or she will only be able to seek 
compensatory damages, and not the punitive damages available to residents of 
privately owned homes.  Without these disclosures, our aging population has no idea 
they are not protected to the same extent as those living in homes not owned by a 
county.  Unfortunately, until these changes occur, most residents or their families 
will only find out the negative effect of Cramer after a violation of their rights has 
occurred. 
The Ohio legislature passed Bill 403 during the 123rd General Assembly session 
in 2000.222  This law required that Ohio create an Ohio Long-Term Care Consumer 
Guide. The Ohio Department of Aging developed the guide.  Under Ohio law, 
nursing homes are not required to participate.  However, current 2006 inspection 
reports are listed for 970 homes.223  The site offers information on satisfaction, 
services offered, daily prices, and ownership, to name a few.224 However, the 
ownership section does not differentiate between government and privately owned 
homes.  Under the current law, this site could offer a valuable service by adding a 
government/private ownership section.  Additionally, the site should highlight those 
homes that are shielded by government immunity when violating a resident’s rights.      
V.  CONCLUSION 
The application of the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort liability act to the rights 
defined in the Nursing Home Bill of Rights is a tangled web.  The Ohio Supreme 
Court has opened the door for the “discretion” defense to apply broadly to the 
provision of medical care in a nursing home.  The effect is that if any discretionary 
action is found, county homes are not liable for ordinary negligence as provided by 
the Nursing Home Bill of Rights.  Instead, county homes could only be liable for 
their employees’ reckless misconduct.  The employees might not be liable 
individually at all.   
All nursing homes that violate a resident’s codified rights should be held 
accountable.  This will only happen when all nursing home residents can seek 
damages for abuse and neglect.  Unfortunately, under Ohio law, many residents are 
unprotected because of the simple happenstance that their home is owned and 
operated by a political subdivision.  Residents enter nursing homes with a sense of 
security regarding certain rights.  But ten percent of those residents are living under a 
                                                                
221 See Consumer Guide available at which  could be used to inform potential residents. 
222 GAIL PATRY ET.AL., NURSING HOME RESIDENT SATISFACTION: AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC 
REPORTING (June 2003) (prepared for Rhode Island Department of Health), at 
http://www.health.state.ri.us/chic/performance/quality/quality16.pdf. 
223 Consumer Guide, supra note 210. 
224 Id. 
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false sense of security.  Most will only find out they are unprotected when the 
damage is done and it is too late.   
The elderly have become the fastest growing segment of the population. With 
over one and a half million resident over the age of sixty five, immediate action is 
required.  Ohio enacted the Nursing Home Bill of rights to protect all nursing home 
residents—not just those fortunate enough to afford the private homes.  Ohio’s 
elderly population deserves to be treated fairly.   
The disparate treatment meted out to residents of county owned homes opens the 
Political Subdivision Act to another challenge:  equal protection.  The law formerly 
recognized that government actors taking part in the marketplace like any other 
participant were liable “in the same manner, and to the same extent” as any other 
participant.  Under Cramer, while residents of non-county owned homes can sue for 
ordinary negligence, county owned homes can be found immune for the same 
conduct.  There is no justification for this disparate treatment.   
